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Abstract
Using a unique dataset collected in 60 Gambian villages, I study six social and
economic networks: (i) land exchange, (ii) labor exchange, (iii) tool and fertilizer
exchange, (iv) credit exchange, (v) matrimonial relationships and (vi) kinship rela-
tionships. A variety of measures gleaned from the Social Network Analysis (SNA)
literature are used to study how features of the networks at different levels of dis-
aggregation are related to various aspects of economic development. In particular,
I focus on the role of ethnic fragmentation and income inequality. Analyzing the
network macrostructure I find that village-level income inequality plays a role in
increasing interactions, while a measure of ethnic fragmentation is only related to
land exchange. At a more disaggregated level, household’s centrality seems to be
determined by traditional roles and other characteristics, including ethnicity and,
to a lesser extent, relative income in the village. At the dyadic level, traditional
roles, family ties and differences in endowments are better predictors of link forma-
tion than income and ethnicity.
Keywords: West Africa, Social Networks, Ethnic Fragmentation, In-
come Inequality.
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“In The Gambia, virtually everything is lendable and at times will be lent. This includes
nearly all factors of agricultural production: land, labor, livestock, seed, fertilizer,
pesticides, and farm tools. Craft tools, vehicles, and household goods are also lent”
Shipton (1990).
1 Introduction
In his pathbreaking article about the embeddedness of economic interactions, Granovetter
(1985) pointed to a great divide in the economics literature of the time. On the one hand,
the undersocialized view of neoclassical models, in which agents are treated as atomized
entities where social structure plays no role. On the other, the oversocialized view of
new institutional economics, in which institutionalized social structures dominate human
actions. The real world must then lie somewhere between the two extremes, with rapidly
changing social structures defined by apparently unstable interactions and multiple links
among agents, thereby creating dynamic and overlapping mesostructures.
During the past two decades, the economics literature has advanced in terms of filling
this gap, particularly with the development of game theory, behavioral economics, infor-
mation economics and, especially, through the study of social and economic networks.
Social Network Analysis (SNA) has been an important component of sociological research
for more than a century, but economists have only recently started to incorporate it into
their toolkit.1 While the concept of social capital proposed by Putnam (1995) called
attention to SNA, it was the modeling efforts of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala
and Goyal (2000) that created the bases for the incorporation of networks in economic
analysis. Since then, a growing body of theoretical literature has been developed, accom-
panied by an increasing number of empirical studies that address issues as diverse as job
search, criminal activities and the use of the internet.2
The present study aims to contribute to the recent empirical literature on the study of
social networks in rural economies. It is part of a broader research project related to very
detailed data about social and economic interactions collected in 60 Gambian villages, in
the context of the impact evaluation of a national level Community-Driven Development
Program (CDDP). This database is used to study how the characteristics of networks at
different levels of disaggregation are related to various aspects of economic development.
In particular, I focus in the role of ethnic fragmentation and income inequality.3 The
empirical analysis that I present is meant to provide a detailed description of the net-
works and the variables associated with their characteristics and results should not be
interpreted in causal terms.
1In Granovetter (2005) there is a broadranging summary of the sociological point of view concerning
the influence of social networks on economic activity.
2For a complete review of the history and recent progresses of SNA in economics, see Jackson (2009).
3It is beyond the scope of the present study to explain the importance of these two factors for economic
development. Ethnic fragmentation has been highlighted as an important impediment for development in
Africa by Easterly and Levine (1997) and a series of follow-up papers, thought the results are questioned
by Arcand, Guillaumont, and Jeanneney (2000). A summary of the topic is provided by Alesina and
Ferrara (2005). Income inequality is considered to be positively associated with economic growth in early
stages of development in the Kuznets tradition but negatively related to political stability (Alesina and
Perotti (1996)), social capital (Knack and Keefer (1997)) and other indicators of social welfare. A review
is provided by Kanbur (2000).
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The main results at the village-level show that income inequality and poverty indica-
tors are important determinants of the macrostructure of networks, but that a measure of
ethnic fragmentation is rarely significant. The analysis at the household level (mesostruc-
ture) reveals that relative income in the village is only associated with participation in a
few networks, while traditional roles, together with other households characteristics, are
important determinants of centrality. Households that belong to ethnic minorities are
less likely to participate in the exchange of labor and credit, but more prone to be land
borrowers. When the unit of analysis attains the link-level (microstructure), the most
basic unit of a network, traditional roles are still fundamental to explain link creation be-
tween two households, along with differences in endowments and family ties. Differences
in income per se only affect link formation in the credit network, while belonging to the
same ethnic group only increases the probability of creating a labor link.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly summarizes the relevant literature
on social networks in rural societies. Section 3 explains in detail the process of data
collection and presents descriptive statistics on villages and households. In section 4
I summarize previous studies that help to understand the cultural anthropology of the
networks. In section 5 the measures to describe networks at different levels are presented,
followed by econometric analysis of their determinants. The final section discusses the
main results and concludes.
2 Literature review: empirical analysis of networks
in Development Economics
Though the crucial role played by social networks in the economic systems of rural soci-
eties has long been recognized,4 formal empirical evidence is fairly recent.5
A natural function of networks is the diffusion of information. As such, understand-
ing them is essential for promoting technological innovations in agriculture, as shown by
Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) in the context of India’s Green Revolution. Significant re-
cent contributions are provided by Conley and Udry (2010) for the adoption of pineapple
crops in Ghana, and Bandiera and Rasul (2006) for sunflower in Mozambique. Network
mechanisms for the transmission of information are also relevant when it comes to the
introduction of public policies, particularly in the area of health, as shown by Miguel
and Kremer (2003) in the context of a deworming drug information program in Kenyan
schools. Behrman, Kohler, and Watkins (2003) for their part, consider perceptions of the
risk of becoming infected with HIV in data from rural Kenya and Malawi.
4In his famous description of the production system of the Trobriand islanders, Malinowski says “it
enmeshes the whole community into a network of reciprocal obligations and dues, one constant flow of
gift and counter-gift” (Malinowski (1921), p.8)
5A fertile area of empirical analysis in developing countries relates to various forms of social capital
(an excellent summary is provided by Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004)). Social capital and social networks
are closely related concepts, the former being a broader (and sometimes loosely defined) concept that
includes the latter. The present literature review is focused on studies that directly relate to social
networks.
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Goods and services, and not just information, are exchanged on social networks. Par-
ticularly relevant for rural economies where access to formal credit markets is limited are
mutual insurance arrangements that help households to deal with adverse shocks. These
usually take the form of an informal exchange of gifts, favors and zero-interest loans that
take place in groups of households linked by kinship, geographical proximity or some
kind of homophily.6 The importance of networks for risk-sharing in rural economies has
been noticed at least since Rosenzweig (1988) work about insurance within the family in
India. Using a sample of households from four villages in rural Philippines, Fafchamps
and Lund (2003) find that risk-sharing does not exist at the village level, but, instead,
mutual help is received within networks of friends and relatives. Fafchamps and Gubert
(2007) expand the analysis of these data to the prediction of links between households,
concluding that geographical distance and differences in income and age are the main
determinants. Using very detailed data for all the households in one village in rural Tan-
zania, De Weerdt and Dercon (2006) find that risk-sharing of health shocks at the village
level is likely to exist in food consumption, but for non-food consumption the insurance
takes place in smaller networks. Using the same data, De Weerdt (2004) analyzes link
formation, confirming the role of kinship, geographical distance and homophily. Comola
(2008) expands the same study to include the indirect benefits stemming from link cre-
ation.
Risk-sharing is far from being the only economic activity in which networks play a
role in rural societies. Given the importance of traditional structures, market imper-
fections and limited access to information and new technologies, one would expect that
most economic exchange would be embedded within networks of interactions that are
very far from the anonymous-atomistic agent models of standard theory. This is the case
of labor-sharing arrangements, as studied by Krishnan and Sciubba (2009) in 15 villages
in Ethiopia. They show that differences in the symmetry of labor networks depend on
the quality of participants and that the architecture of these networks is relevant in terms
of economic performance. Few studies have jointly analyzed the different networks that
overlap in rural economies. To my knowledge, the first empirical attempt to deal with
the issue is Udry and Conley (2004). They use data stemming from 4 villages in Ghana
to relate four different exchanges: information, credit, land and labor, finding evidence
of the relevance of networks in these activities.
The present study contributes to expanding the literature in various ways. First,
the characteristics of the data allow us to compare various networks in both formal and
informal transactions (land, labor, inputs and credit), controlling for dyadic family ties
and other characteristics. Second, given the availability of information for a large number
of villages and a complete census of links in each village, I can analyze simultaneously
the networks at different levels: village (macrostructure), household (mesostructure) and
link (microstructure). Third, I take advantage of these data to explore how key aspects
of economic development can be empirically studied from a network perspective, with a
particular focus on ethnic diversity and income inequality.
6These arrangements sometimes take place in more established organizations that form networks
governed by a set of (usually unwritten) rules (Bhattamishra and Barrett, 2010), like ROSCAS (Besley,
Coate, and Loury, 1994 and Anderson and Baland, 2002) and funeral groups (Dercon, De Weerdt, Bold,
and Pankhurst (2006)).
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The literature on networks and ethnic diversity has produced results that are by no
means clear-cut. Some studies argue that different ethnicities mistrust each other and are
less likely to create links: “lower trust between diverse ethnic groups makes it difficult to
form the social networks (social capital) that promote growth by disseminating advanced
technology and economically useful knowledge.” (Easterly (2001), p.689). Thought there
are many case studies that relate ethnic fragmentation to warfare and segregation, the
empirical literature on social networks is far from being consistent in confirming this
idea. Grimard (1997) finds that Ivorian households tend to partially risk-share within
the same ethnic group. Analyzing the membership in various community based organiza-
tions (CBOs), Arcand and Fafchamps (2008) find that households of the same ethnicity
are more likely to belong to the same group in Burkina Faso and Senegal, thought a caveat
is that ethnicity may just be a proxy for other characteristics not measured captured by
their data. Hoddinott, Dercon, and Krishnan (2005) point out that households belonging
to ethnic minorities do not have smaller mutual assistance networks when describing the
same data from rural Ethiopia used by Krishnan and Sciubba (2009). Analyzing trade
credit in market towns of Benin, Malawi and Madagascar, Fafchamps (2003) finds no ev-
idence that ethnicity is an important predictor for trust in business, when other network
characteristics are controlled for.
The debate concerning income inequality follows similar lines. Differences in income
can generate lack of trust between groups that can lead to polarization, marginalization
and suboptimal socioeconomic interactions. On the other hand, income heterogeneity
can generate opportunities for interactions that are not possible in egalitarian societies.
For example, assuming that risk aversion decreases with income, richer households are
in a better position to insure poorer brethren. Consistent with this idea, Fafchamps and
Gubert (2007) find that differences in wealth (which are highly correlated with income
in their data) are important determinants of the existence of a risk-sharing link between
households. Using a different database, Comola (2008) confirms the result that rich house-
holds are willing to create links with less wealthy ones. Nevertheless, Santos and Barrett
(2006) find that the poorest herders among Boran pastoralists in southern Ethiopia are
excluded from insurance networks. Udry and Conley (2004) also find that individuals
who differ in their wealth are not likely to exchange credit and gifts. They find the same
result for the labor network, but in the case of the land and information networks income
inequality increases the probability of a link. In terms of CBOs membership, Arcand and
Fafchamps (2008) find evidence of assortative matching by wealth.
3 Data collection and description
3.1 Data collection strategy
The methodology adopted for the present study differs from that of traditional household
surveys in which a random sample of households is collected in each village. The goal is
to collect data for the full range of nodes participating in different networks within the
village, as well as the external links of these nodes. Given the costs associated with imple-
menting LSMS-type surveys for all households in a village, structured group interviews
geared to collect quantitative information were implemented instead. Therefore, village
censuses were carried out through gatherings co-organized with the village chief (Alkalo)
and district-level officers. In such village meetings it is possible to obtain relatively coarse
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quantitative information -with a particular focus on socio-economic interactions- for al-
most all households in each village. This type of approach is common in ethnographic
research and is related to the rapid rural appraisal methodology that has been success-
fully used in the past for quantitative analysis in different disciplines (Chambers (1994)).
The data collection consisted of the following strategy: Two enumerators spent 1 to 2
days days in each village. The first step was a meeting with the village chief or his repre-
sentative, to explain the purpose of the visit and to offer a traditional symbolic gift to the
village (kola nuts). The Alkalo was consulted about general village information and his
authorization to use the taxation roster, where all compound heads are registered, was
secured in order to create a list of households. With the Alkalo’s assistance, household
heads were invited to gather in the village’s meeting point (bantaba). As the heads were
arriving at the bantaba, enumerators formed groups of 5 to 8 people and administered
simultaneously the questionnaire to all members of this group. Though questions were
closed-ended, some interaction among participants was allowed, to clarify data that were
incomplete or doubtful. The process was repeated until all households had been inter-
viewed. Sometimes it was necessary to move to some specific compounds to individually
administer the questionnaire because of households head being sick and (in a few cases)
because some individuals refused to be interviewed in the bantaba. Simultaneously in
some villages Focus Groups were conducted for three groups of villagers, men, women
and youth, with the goal to better understand the structure of each community.
The structured group survey gathered two categories of information. The first sec-
tion was a standard (and very lean) household questionnaire designed to collect a vector
of household characteristics including: economic and demographic indicators, household
head characteristics, extent of ties with traditional village authorities, membership in
various village-level groups, household migrants, and sources of external information.
In order to see how such data differ from that gathered in standard surveys, Figure 1
compares the distribution of income in 15 villages where, some months earlier, a ran-
dom sample of households were interviewed using LSMS techniques in the context of the
baseline analysis of the Gambia CDDP impact evaluation, with very detailed questions
about different sources of income for the month preceding the survey. Both distributions
share the same support, but group data are more concentrated at the mean and have a
notably high level of kurtosis. It is possible to see that in the left-hand portion of the
densities, where poorer households are located, the distributions are very similar, but
richer respondents seem to provide downward-biased information in the context of group
survey. The comparison should be taken with caution however, because the LSMS-type
survey was conducted right after the rainy season. Annualized income, particularly for
the rich, can be overestimated in such data when is collected during this period.
The second section of the survey instrument was specifically designed to understand
the networks in the village. Given that a list of all households in the village before the
gatherings was systematically established, it was possible to assign a unique identifier
to each household head beforehand.7 The names of all the villagers (that were matched
with the unique identifier) with whom members of the household had had interactions in
six networks, using the following questions:
7If during the interviews some individuals were recognized as household heads by the community but
not present in the list, the new household was added and assigned a new identifier number to it.
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 LAND=Of the land you cultivated last year: did you lend out or borrow in land
from other villagers? If yes, what is the amount of land?
 LABOUR=Did you, or any members of your household, work for other households
during the last year (2008-9)? If yes, how many days?
 INPUT=Did you lend out to or borrow in any means of production (such as tools
or fertilizer) from other households in the last year (2008-9)?
 CREDIT=Did you lend out to or borrow in money from other household in last
year (2008-9)?
 MARRIAGE=Have any of your household members married members of other
households?
 KINSHIP=With which households do your family members have kinship relation-
ships?
In what follows, I will refer to the first four as economic networks and the last two as
family networks. For each of these networks, also was asked the existence of connexions
external to the village.
3.2 Sample and household data description
The survey was conducted between February and May of 2009. 60 Gambian villages,
mainly in rural areas (just 4 villages are in semi-urban areas), were randomly selected.
In order to achieve a modicum of representativity at the national level, for each of the 6
Local Government Areas (LGAs) eligible for the CDDP program (out of the 8 in to which
Gambian territory is divided), wards were randomly selected, a smaller geographical di-
vision that tends to be homogeneous in geographical but heterogeneous in socio-cultural
terms. Finally, 3 to 8 villages were randomly drawn within each ward.
In order to minimize selection problems it was attempted to interview all households
in the village, yielding a median household coverage rate of 94% (when the number of sur-
veyed households is compared with those on the taxation list). We targeted the household
head for interview purposes, but, in cases where he or she was absent or not able to an-
swer, it was allowed someone else to answer, either another household member or a close
relative. This was the case for 28% of the sample. Finally, 3,320 persons were interviewed.
In Tables 1 and 2 I present descriptive statistics for the data collected using the first
survey instrument, the general questionnaire. In the first of these tables I present village-
level statistics (60 observations) while in the second I present the household-level data, for
a sample reduced to the units that I will use in the empirical analysis (2,810 observations
when incomplete data are removed).
The data on village population available in the 2003 Gambian Census (used to con-
struct the sampling frame) turned out to be significantly out of date and, in some cases,
very inaccurate. This explains that even just villages with populations between 300 and
1,000 inhabitants were targeted, in practice the smallest village has 202 inhabitants and
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the largest 1,402. The average population of the surveyed villages is 586 inhabitants.
Population density, at least when the denominator is the inhabited area, is high, with
an average of 6,900 inhabitants per square kilometer. In contrast, agricultural land was
usually very abundant. The average amount of agricultural land per active worker was
around two hectares, when land usage rights for the year of the survey were considered,
with a great deal of variation given that the average standard deviation at the village
level was 4.6 hectares.
Average household size, on the basis of the household data, is 12.6 members (see Table
2), and slightly lower (11.6) when the mean of village medians is considered, reported in
Table 1. While some households appear exceedingly large, respondents were very clear in
terms of their definition of a household. The presence of households with more than 50
members (approximately 1% of the sample) is explained both by the polygamous nature
of Gambian rural society and the existence of marabout households where the household
is constituted by a mass of disciples and other followers. 45% of households declare to
be polygamous and there was at least one marabout in half of the villages in the sample.
As is to be expected in West Africa, a very small number of household heads are females
(7%), generally represented by widows and mainly concentrated in the semi-urban areas
on the outskirts of Banjul (the national capital). These villages also accounted for the
few non-Muslims in the sample (4%).
The sample is representative of the ethnic diversity in The Gambia. 41% of the re-
spondents are Mandinka, 26% Fula, 8% Wollof, 7% Jola and 4% Serer, with the rest
either belonging to local ethnic minorities or being non-Gambian (these represent 4% of
the sample).8 While some villages are very homogeneous in terms of ethnic composition,
others are very diverse. 22% of tour respondents come from a minority ethnic group in
their village, thought in some villages the predominant group accounts for no more than
30% of respondents. I build an Ethnic Diversity Index as EDI = (1 −∑Ne=1 s2e), where se
is the share of each ethnic group in the village. The EDI ranges from zero (complete
homogeneity) to 0.84, with a mean of 0.3.
The economic conditions in the villages in the sample correspond, by and large, to
those of traditional rural societies. There is almost no access to electricity, with an av-
erage village-level access rate of 3%. 88% of households have no access to an improved
source of water, while 38% lack access to a private toilet. 38% of household dwellings are
built with grass. 82% of the respondents declared having no formal education, although
a substantial fraction of the villagers received some kind of koranic education and usually
master basic Arabic language skills. The main economic activity is related to agriculture
(66% of households have this as their main activity) or fisheries (6%). Nevertheless, a
Herfindahl index of sectoral heterogeneity shows a significant degree of diversity, driven
mainly by the presence of inhabitants working outside the village (25%). Monetary in-
come is very low. The average (self-declared) annual income per capita is 3,565 Gambian
Dalasis, which corresponds to approximately 90 Euros (using the exchange rate of 2009),
and just around 12% of this income stems from agricultural activities. The distribution of
income is, moreover, not necessarily egalitarian in all villages. Though the average Gini
coefficient is 0.34, it reaches 0.5 in some villages. The higher level of inequality reported
8Compared with the data for rural areas of the 2003 Census for The Gambia, the sample overrepresents
Mandinkas (33%) and underrepresents Wollof (15%).
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in some villages seems to be driven by remittances and off-farm jobs. Around half of
the respondents declare having current or former household members who work outside
the village, including 12% who receive remittances from overseas migrants outside Africa.
4 Cultural anthropology of the networks
The basic unit of study will be the household, the definition of which is not straightfor-
ward. Villagers in rural Gambia are usually organized into compounds, a concept which
corresponds to members of the same family, usually related by blood or marriage, living
in a group of huts surrounded by a grass fence. Most of the time a compound can be
identified as a household, meaning that the members eat together, organize daily activ-
ities in common and have a head who takes most important decisions. Nevertheless, it
is sometimes the case that some members of a compound declare themselves to be an
independent household, with their own head. The independence of a household within
a compound is related to two local concepts: the dabadas or farm production units and
the sinkiros, cooking and consumption units (Webb (1989)). People in the same dabada
tend to belong to the same sinkiro, and more than one of these units can be found in-
side compounds, particularly when it comes to the largest of these. The intra-compound
distinction was, in most cases, clear to the alkalo and all other village inhabitants. Just
16% of the household heads in the sample are not the head of the compounds where they
live.
The choice of a household as the unit of analysis is not without cost. As noted by Udry
(1996) and Goldstein and Udry (2008), among others, the assumption of within-household
Pareto efficiency is far from reality in West African rural societies. The relationships that
uncovered with the data collection strategy might therefore be interpreted in terms of
the networks centered on the household head and might not necessarily reflect the com-
plete network of the household. In the context of The Gambia, Carney and Watts (1990)
and von Braun and Webb (1989) have shown that the decision-making process inside
compounds and households is complex, particularly considering that individual resource
allocation is sometimes divided between common farm land, known in the Mandinka
language as maruo, and private plots or kamanyango, where members of the household,
such as some of the wives or the young people, can manage a crop under their exclu-
sive control. It was asked how much of the respondent’s land is kamanyango (or any
similar concept of private plot in the local dialect). 25% of the compound heads that
practice agriculture declared to have at least a portion of land cultivated as kamanyango.9
Carney and Watts (1990) describe the clear division of labour in Mandinka society,
which is largely similar in villages dominated by other ethnic groups. Men cultivate cash-
crop plots, mainly groundnuts, but recently also fruit trees, in conjunction with some
staple food such as millet, maize and sorghum. Women grow rice and take care of the
village garden (if there is one).10 In semi-urban areas there are almost no agricultural
9Just 6% of the respondants declared to have more than a quarter of the land as kamanyango. Of
those declaring no kamanyango, a portion was not familiar with the concept and it was not possible to
explain its meaning.
10This division of labour is very ingrained. Several efforts of the British colonial authorities and post-
independence programs have failed to incorporate men in rice production, a very important factor when
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plots and inhabitants usually have titles for the land they use. This is in contrast with
rural areas, where there is usually no land scarcity (at least in terms of quantity, but not
necessarily in terms of quality) but the unwritten rights over its usage are determined by
the descendants of the village’s founders, generally the Alkalo and his direct relatives. In
some cases, the kabilo (clan) heads, who might not be related to the founder’s lineage but
represent the descendants of other early settlers, are entitled to permanent usage rights.11
All other villagers must borrow plots on either a seasonal or an annual basis from them,
in agreements that can also last for several years (Chavas, Petrie, and Roth (2005)).
Sometimes other individuals own small plots of land outright that can be lent or rented.
The transactions in the LAND network will therefore principally be given by a money-
less assignment of plots, though they can sometimes imply a remunerated rental contract.
While land is not scarce, labor is, particularly before and during the rainy season. The
solutions to a household shortage of workers constitute the core of the interactions in the
LABOUR network. The available alternatives are described by Swindell (1978): the use
of kafos, an organized workforce of villagers who participate in the provision of public
goods but who can also be hired for a fixed wage by a household; the hiring of particular
villager or outsider at a given “market” wage; inviting other villagers or outsiders to help
with household tasks in exchange for various kinds of goods, labor or even a marriage
arrangement; the use of strange farmers that provide part-time labor in exchange for the
right of use of part of the family plot for his own benefit.
The links in the INPUT network are defined as exchanges of means of production
that imply a monetary or opportunity cost for the lender, such as tools, cattle, fertilizer,
seeds and the like. While cattle are usually lent for milk, manure and transport during
the whole year, agricultural tools and inputs are particularly important in the period
before the rainy season. This seasonality is also explained by the investment decisions of
the villagers. While some invest in means of productions after the crop season, others do
not, either because of a bad year for cash crops or due to substitution effects driven by
consumption of non-productive goods. The exchange can also be driven by risk-sharing
behavior with households investing in differentiated means of production.
Information concerning the CREDIT network must be taken with caution. While
there exists lively money lending and borrowing amongst villagers, it is not easy to secure
these data. During the field tests prior to the survey we were initially reluctant to ask
information about money exchange, thinking that it might be perceived as being disre-
spectful. On the contrary, it was found that villagers were in general willing to respond
to questions related to credit. The clue was given by one of the local enumerators: “In
Islam there is no interest rate. If you lend money it means that you are helping at the
moment when the other really needs it, so you are doubly blessed. While usually lenders
will not reveal the information, grateful borrowers will.” On the other hand, this idea can
be in contradiction with the local concept of juloo (rope): “It can refer to a small-scale
trader, or to credit or debt. Every Mandinko knows the meanings are related. Traders
it comes to understanding the country’s dependence on imported food.
11As remarked by Webb (1989), the rights over land are related to the old social structure, with the
former highest castes having the most productive plots. Apart from its historical consequences, mainly
in terms of the division into freeborn and former slaves, the caste system is not relevant in rural Gambia
nowadays, and interviewees were generally not willing to talk about their ancestors’ caste.
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are also lenders, and their loans, while sometimes useful like a rope ladder, also tie down
a farmer like a rope around the neck” (Shipton (1990)). Apart from the direct borrowing
of money from another household in the village, there is also the possibility of obtaining
credit from external sources, both informal and formal (mainly rural development banks
or microcredit agencies), or from some village-level rotating saving and credit associations
(ROSCAs), locally know as osusus.12 Other forms of organized saving, such as the village
bank where women save incomes from their gardens or skill center are also available.
With respect to the family networks, in the small villages in which the surveys were
conducted kinship relationships are very common and are usually dominated by the lin-
eage of the village founders and the oldest settlers. Intermarriage within families is
common and there is also a very active inter-village exchange of brides. In polygamous
rural Gambia, it is often the case that the first marriage is arranged between the elders
of the respective families, while the other wives are requested by the husband according
to his capacity to sustain a bigger family.
5 Empirical analysis of the social and economic net-
works
5.1 Network measurement
I will consider a household as a node i in each of the m networks gm. I restrict each
network gm to consist of a set of nodes belonging to N = 1, ..., n where n is the number of
households inside each village. Figures 2 to 6 present graphical representations of some
of the networks in the data, where the arrows represent the existence of a directed link
between nodes and the nodes in the upper left section do not have any links in this par-
ticular network.
Theoretical predictions of link formation are difficult to come by. Applying the con-
cept of pairwise stability proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) usually results in
multiple equilibria and unclear predictions. In this paper I will limit to the empirical
estimation of the observed links, registered as an indicator variable which it is assumed
to be generated by:
`mijv = 1 if B[d+ji (gm)] −C[d+ji (gm)] > 0, `mijv = 0 otherwise,
where B[d+ji (gm)] is the benefit of increasing i’s degree in network gm by creating
a link with j and C[d+ji (gm)] is the associated cost. The benefits are (not exclusively)
given by the access to the resources involved in each network (for borrowers) and to
well-connected people via link creation with households that play important roles in the
village. The costs are associated with losses in resources (for lenders), with the opportu-
nity cost of creating a different link, and are also a function of the differences between
i and j along a number of dimensions, including household size, ethnic group, kinship
lineage and educational attainment. When analyzing the data at the link level, I will
12In the CDDP baseline survey, 58% of the rural villages declared to have at least one osusu association.
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refer to microstructure.
A basic metric of the embeddedness of a node i in a network gm is its degree, di(gm),
measured as the number of links involving this particular node. In the case of the data,
a distinction must be made depending on the directionality of the link. If the link goes
from i to j, then it be counted in the measure of the out-degree. Formally:
Out-degree: douti (gm) = ∑j `ij.
In the economic networks, the out-degree of i is related to its position as a lender. In
the case of MARRIAGE out-degree is associated with being a sender. When the link
goes in the other direction, from j to i, it will be counted as part of the in-degree of i:
In-degree: dini (gm) = ∑j `ji.
For economic networks the in-degree is a characteristic of i as borrower. In the
MARRIAGE network this corresponds to being a receiver. In the case of KINSHIP ,
the data are undirected, so that in-degree and out-degree are the same.
Table 3 show the matrix of simple correlations of in- and out-degree for the different
networks. While most of the correlations are positive and significant at the 5% level, in-
dicating that households have similar degree in all networks, this is not always the case.
In LAND, borrowers and lenders are negatively correlated in degree, indicating that
land-for-land transactions are not common, and the household is either a pure lender or
a pure borrower. Though sometimes statistically significant, the degree in MARRIAGE,
both as sender and receiver, appears to be uncorrelated with the otehr networks, with
the obvious exception of KINSHIP . The degree in the latter is correlated with all other
networks, except land lenders.
In order to be able to compare across networks, degree centrality is usually expressed
as a proportion of the total possible links in each particular network:
Degree centrality: Cmd (i) = di(gm)n − 1 .
When I study the data at the node (household) level, aggregating over its links, it
will be considering mesostructure.
In the first two columns of Table 4 I present basic statistics for the distribution of in-
and out-degree centrality in different networks. The average degree tends to be between
1% and 2% of total possible links, except for KINSHIP with 10%, but the data are
very heterogeneous, indicating important differences in the centrality of households.
Though the networks are defined in terms of within-village interactions, the links of
each household with nodes outside the village were also registered. Columns 3 and 4
of Table 4 present the distribution of a variable that is equal to one if the household
has at least one external link, and zero otherwise. External-in are links created to bring
something to the village, with external-out representing the opposite direction. External
actors are very important for the marriage network, but in economic networks less than
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10% of the surveyed households have at least one link outside the village (exept for credit
borrowers). This fact provides support for the idea that the most important interactions
in the networks take place inside villages.
Given its definition, the analysis of network architecture or aggregate characteristics
is at village-level. I will refer to this as macrostructure. A common measure used in SNA
at this level is the density of the network, the sum of the degree of all egos in the network
gm over total possible links:
Density: D(gm) = ∑ni=1 di(gm)(n − 1)n .
The density can be considered as the probability of forming a link in a purely ran-
dom network of average degree di(gm). The second panel of Table 4 presents descriptive
statistics for the macrostructure. In the first column the number of links in each net-
work is reported and in the second column its density. Densities are between 2% and 5%
for most networks, with the exception of KINSHIP which has an average density of
14%, confirming the fact that in several villages the inhabitants tend to be close relatives.
An important regularity observed in the SNA literature is that an ego’s links, instead
of being distributed evenly, tend to be concentrated in local neighborhoods, creating clus-
ters of egos well connected among themselves but not with the rest of the network (“my
friends tend to be friends amongst themselves”). A standard measure used to study this
feature is the clustering coefficient, Cli(gm), which represents the probability that j and
k are linked given that i has a link with both:
Clustering coefficient: Cli(gm) = ∑j≠i;k≠j;k≠i `ij`ik`jk∑j≠i;k≠j;k≠i `ij`ik .
The clustering coefficient for a given network gm can be calculated as a weighted av-
erage of Cli(gm):
Cl(gm) =∑
i
Cli(gm)wi,
where wi is a weight given by di(gm) (i’s undirected degree). A simple way to assess
the presence of clusters in a network is to compare the average clustering coefficient with
the density. In Table 4 it is possible to see that the networks differ in terms of their level of
clustering: for KINSHIP and INPUT the average Cl(gm) is higher than D(gm), while
the opposite is true for LAND (these differences are significant at the 99% level). The
low level of clustering in LAND is related to the hierarchical ownership of land described
in the last section, which impedes transitivity in its exchange. In fact, it is very common
to observe the emergence of stars in the LAND network (where Cli(gm) = 0), with the
Alkalo or another descendent of the founders being the hub (see Figure 2). For LABOR,
CREDIT and MARRIAGE there is no clear evidence of clustering.13 Nevertheless, it
is important to consider that this average comparison hides some important diffences for
particular networks. For example, Figure 3 represents a labor network with D(gm) being
13The p-value for the one tailed test of the null hypothesis of mean Cl(gm) > D(gm) is 0.968 for
LABOR, 0.972 for CREDIT and 0.934 for MARRIAGE. The p-values for the two tailed test of the
equality of means are 0.062, 0.054 and 0.13 respectively.
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more than one standard deviation above the mean density, but with zero Cl(gm). Figure
4 represents the diametrically opposite situation, with Cl(gm) almost 10 times bigger
than D(gm).
A useful concept from SNA is the component, a subnetwork of the network gm such
that its nodes are connected amongst themselves but disconnected from the rest. The
network in Figure 4 has nine components (when isolated nodes are not considered). In
a random network, a standard prediction is that as the probability of forming a link in-
creases, a giant component that connect most of the elements in the network will emerge.
As shown in the original work of Erdo˝s and Re`nyi (1960), in a Poisson random network
where the probability of forming a link is greater than 1n , a giant component emerges,
and when the probability increases to log(n)n , all the elements in the network are con-
nected. When the formation of networks is strategic or links represent family ties, the
links can be distributed in very different ways. For example, in the case of the network
in Figure 4, D(gm) is around the 1n threshold, but there are many components, some of
which being relatively big, instead of just one giant component. This is similar to the
case of the network represented in Figure 5, with D(gm) well above the first threshold,
but still with 4 components, two of them being very big. With respect to the second
threshold, in most of the networks where D(gm) > log(n)n all nodes are connected in the
giant component (with the exception of few isolated egos). Nevertheless, this is not the
case for KINSHIP , where 45 networks have density over the threshold, but 21 of them
have more than one component (see Figure 6 as an example).
To study this feature of the data, an index of compactness will be used defined as:14
Index of compactness: Cmp(gm) = C∑
c=1 s2c ,
where sc is the share of nodes in each component over the total number of nodes.
When the network is a collection of several small component Cmp(gm) ∈ [0,0.1]. If links
are concentrated in few big components Cmp(gm) ∈ [0.1,0.5]. When most of the nodes
are in the giant component Cmp(gm) ∈ [0.5,1]. The statistics in Table 4 indicate that
KINSHIP is, on average, more compact than other networks, as opposed to CREDIT
which displays the smallest average index of compactness. Nonetheless, this index has a
great deal of variance in all networks, and the differences are rarely statistically significant.
5.2 Macrostructure: network architecture
I now turn to the analysis of the village characteristics associated with network archi-
tecture. The approach will be to take each network gmv as the unit of analysis, with
m = {LAND, LABOUR, INPUTS, CREDIT , KINSHIP , MARRIAGE} and v cor-
responds to each of the 60 villages for which there is information, yielding a total of 360
observations. The empirical specification will be as follows:
ymv = G (αward + αm + αethnic + αactivity +Xvβ) (1)
where ymv is one of the three village-level network characteristics described below:
density, clustering and compactness, G(.) is the logistic function, and Xv the vector of
14In sociology this index has been used under the name of component size heterogeneity.
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relevant village characteristics. I will be particularly interested in the Ethnic Diversity In-
dex (EDI) and the Gini coefficient of inequality in self-reported income. A set of dummies
to control for unobservables is also included: taking advantage of the stratified nature of
the sampling scheme, ward-specific effects (αward) that control for several geographical
characteristics, such as distance to the capital and other important population centers
or climate. Also network-specific effects are considered (αm), as well as dummies corre-
sponding to the predominant ethnic group in the village (αethnic) and its main economic
activity (αactivity).
Since network measures are proportions, a quasi-MLE procedure is implemented to
estimate equation (1), implementing the fractional logit procedure proposed by Papke
and Wooldridge (1996).15 Table 5 presents the results when the estimation is over the
pooled set of networks, as well as when dividing the sample into economic networks
(LAND, LABOUR, INPUTS and CREDIT ) and family networks (KINSHIP and
MARRIAGE). In Table 6 the results are presentd for each network separately, using a
more parsimonious model (given the limited number of degrees of freedom) to estimate
the parameters βm associated to Xv in each network. I report the goodness of fit measure
proposed by Cameron and Windmeijer (1997), based on deviance.
Density and compactnesses are always decreasing in village population, while this
characteristic is not significant for clustering, with a few exceptions such as LABOR,
which is more clustered in bigger populations. Average household size displays a signifi-
cantly positive association with network density (again an unsurprising result, since larger
households will have more members who can potentially interact with other households
in the village). This variable is also associated with significantly more clustered networks,
a result that seems to be driven by the INPUT network, and with more compact net-
works in the case of LABOR. Population density is negatively correlated with clustering
and positively correlated with compactness in some networks, but has no effect on density.
Income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient constructed from self-declared
household monetary income per capita, appears as an important factor in increasing both
D(gm) and Cmp(gm) and decreasing Cl(gm). In the case of the first two measures,
the effect seems to be related to the input and credit networks, while for the latter the
driving force is the family network. This finding is in line with the hypothesis of income
inequality being a factor which increases exchanges in networks, as a result of some com-
plementarities between richer and poorer households. I will come back to this point later.
Most of the other indices capturing economic diversity, such as the standard deviation of
household size and land per capita, are never statistically different from zero and are not
reported, with the exception of diversity in economic activity, which is associated with
significantly lower levels of density and clustering.
The various indicators of poverty are associated with higher densities and compact-
ness, but this is not the case for monetary income per capita, which is never a significant
explanatory variable. In the case of D(gm) the results are mainly associated with labor
and credit exchanges, while Cmp(gm) is higher in poorer villages for all economic net-
works except for LAND. The regressions in Table 6 show that the poverty indicators are
15The main results hold if the equation is estimated using OLS with fixed effects. These results are
available upon request.
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positively associated with clustering for LABOR, CREDIT and KINSHIP , while the
association is negative in the case of MARRIAGE.
While the EDI is usually not significant in the aggregated models presented in Table
5, in the individual network regressions it is possible to see that ethnic diversity is associ-
ated with higher density and compactness in the land network, while it is associated with
more clustering in family networks. As such, no evidence of negative effects of ethnic
fragmentation is found on the economic activities of the village using the macrostructure
measures of networks.
A final result concerns the importance of interactions outside the network, measured
by the percentage of households with external links in each village-network. In Table
6 the coefficients associated with the percentage of households with external links as
senders (external-out) and receivers (external-in) are reported. While the coefficients are
not always statistically significant, the results indicate that villages with more external
senders have higher density and compactness, with the opposite being true for villages
with more external receivers.
5.3 Mesostructure: household centrality
In this section the household-level variables associated with degree centrality are studied.
Once again we estimate a fractional logit, since the dependent variable, be it the in-
degree (borrowers/receivers) or the out-degree (lenders/senders) centrality, is expressed
as a proportion over total potential links in the network. The model to be estimated is
given by:
Cmd (iv) = G (αmv + αmethnic + αmacty +Xivβm) (2)
where dummies to account for unobservables at the village level (αv) are included, as
well as the household head’s ethnic group (αethnic) and economic activity (αacty). The
vector of household-level characteristics, Xiv, will be divided, for clarity in the exposition,
in three groups: Xhhiv , a vector of socio-economic household characteristics; X
role
iv , a vector
of characteristics related to the role of the household head in the village; and Xextivm, that
indicates whether the household has an external link in network m.
In Table 7 presents the results for the Xhhiv vector of regressors. Household size plays
an important role in how active a node is in networks, and has a positive effect on degree
for most of the networks. Older household heads tend to be borrowers of labor. For the
economic networks, evidence that decisions are taken at the household level is found, with
the exception of land exchange, because compound heads are not significantly different
in degree compared with others. Household heads with some level of formal education
are less likely to be borrowers of land and inputs. When agriculture constitutes an im-
portant component of income, households tend to borrow land and lend labor. While the
amount of land over which the household has rights is only significant in the land lender
equation, a particularly interesting result emerges with respect to land quality. Though
this variable is measured with error (it is self-declared), it can be seen that households
that declare having high quality land are more central as land lenders, but also as labor
borrowers, credit lenders and in the exchange of inputs. I interpret this as evidence that
having better land is related to the time the household has been settled in the village
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(a variable not available in the data), though it could also be related to other possible
aspects of social status.
To analyze the participation of ethnic minorities in networks, I divide the sample into
a first group whose household heads belong to minorities that represent less than 30%
of the population of the village, a second group of households who belong to a minority
that represents between 30 and 50% of the village population, and the rest. There are
461 households in the first group and 88 in the second. As shown by the results reported
in Table 7, ethnic minorities are active borrowers of land. In the case of small minorities
(household s whose ethnicity represents less than 30% of the village population) degree
as labor and credir lenders is also smaller, and they are less embedded in the family
networks. These results suggest that minorities are not disciminated against in terms of
getting land from the village founders’ descendants, but can face a modicum of exclusion
in other networks.
In terms of monetary income, I divide households into quartiles. The relative position
of the household in the village’s income distribution is related to centrality for input and
credit networks, in line with the results for macrostructure presented in section 5.2. For
INPUT , households in the intermediate quartiles are more active in exchange than those
in the first quartile (the reference group). In terms of CREDIT , households from the
richest quartile are, unsurprisingly, more likely to be lenders.
The fact that differences in income plays a relatively limited role in a household’s cen-
trality may be related to the fact that traditional structures and roles are more important
than monetary income. In Table 8 shows that the role played by the household head in
the village (Xroleiv ) is indeed fundamental. The village chief or Alkalo always has a higher
degree, with the exception of labor and marriage networks. In rural areas, the Alkalo is
the oldest descendant of the village founders and is usually both the most respected figure
and the one who takes the main decisions at the village level, usually in consultation with
the Council of Elders. The members of this council are active as input and credit lenders,
and its head as a land lender. The Alkalo’s relatives only have a higher degree as land
lenders (not surprisingly since on average 30% of the households are blood-related with
the chief, with this figure sometimes reaching 90%), and the Alkalo’s assistants a higher
degree as labor and input lenders. The Village Development Council (VDC), which is the
most decentralized part of the Gambian national system of development coordination,
links a village with officers at the ward and LGA levels. The members of the VDC are
representatives from each kabilo, each CBO and other co-opted members. VDC members
are very embedded in terms of kinship relations and tend to be central in all economic
networks.
Being a religious leader is also important. While all villages have at least one Imam
that leads prayers, only half have a Marabout, a respected Koranic teacher who is some-
times imbued with mystical powers and who maintains some syncretic pre-Islamic tradi-
tions such as making amulets for good luck. Both are active as credit lenders and the
Imam as a labor borrower (one of the main public activities in the villages is the con-
struction and maintenance of the Mosque). Also it was asked whether respondents had
treated other villagers using traditional medicine methods, since the traditional healer is
a very respected person, a fact reflected by his higher degree as a borrower of labor, input
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and credit. The traditional musician and story-teller, the Griot, is also central in terms
of being a land and credit lender.
Table 9 the importance of networks external to the village is explored. A dummy
variable which is equal to 1 if a household has a external link in each network is included,
either to bring (external-in) or to send (external-out) something/someone (Xextivm). House-
hold’s degree appears to be negatively correlated with the existence of external links
within each network (e.g., households receiving inputs from outside are less likely to both
borrow and lend inputs inside the village).
5.4 Microstructure: links in the network
To study the variables related to the existence of a link between two households, I will
follow the literature on dyadic regressions by posing the following empirical specification:
`mijv = αmv + (Xiv −Xjv)βmdif + (Xiv +Xjv)βmsum +wijvβmdyad + mijv (3)
where the vector Xiv is made up of household socio-economic characteristics (Xhhiv ),
their roles in the village (Xroleiv ) and the existence of external links in each network (X
ext
ivm).
The directed formation of links is studied, which implies that `mijv ≠ `mjiv. More precisely,
`mijv = 1 if i is the lender and j the borrower. In most networks it is very rare to observe
individuals being both borrower and lender in within the same dyad, with the exception
of the INPUT network. To take this fact in consideration, I split INPUT into pure
borrowers-lenders on the one hand and sharers on the other. The latter lend and borrow
inputs at the same time (INPUTSHARER). To preserve symmetry on the right-hand-
side, I follow Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) by specifying three types of regressors: the
coefficient βdif is associated with the difference in attributes between i and j; βsum is
associated with the sum of the attributes of the members of the dyad; and βdyad the
parameter associated to the variable wijv that corresponds to common characteristics of
i and j. The disturbance terms mijv are allowed to be correlated across observations in-
volving the same individual using the two-dimensional clustering methodology described
in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011).
Table 10 displays the results for Xhhiv . A pair of household heads with a direct kinship
relationship (consanguinity) are more likely to form a link in all networks. When the kin-
ship stems from one of the wives, the likelihood of forming a link also increases, except for
the LAND and INPUTSHARER networks. As expected, when the sum of the sizes of
both households is bigger, they are more prone to establish a link in all networks (a result
that resembles the gravity equation for trade between two countries). If they differ in size,
the probability of lending LAND and LABOR decreases. Conversely, the probability of
lending increases for the INPUT and CREDIT networks. Older household heads tend
to be borrowers of workers and lenders of inputs, but do not display homophily in terms
of forming links with household heads of similar age. When the sum of the percentages of
income stemming from agriculture is bigger, the households are more likely to exchange
labor. Heterogeneity between households in this variable reduces the likelihood of lending
land and increases the likelihood of lending of CREDIT .
Once one controls for various characteristics, belonging to the same ethnic group is
not an important predictor of links, with the exception of LABOR and the mutual ex-
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change of inputs. This is in line with earlier results. I will expand on this finding in the
concluding section.
The sum and differences in declared income per capita are generally not significant cor-
related to link creation, with the notable exception that richer households are more likely
to lend money, the only real monetary transaction that is common amongst villagers.
Nevertheless, wealth may be better captured by other endowments of the households.
For instance, when the sum of land over which the households in the dyad have rights of
use increases, the probability of establishing a relationship is higher in all the networks
apart from CREDIT . When differences in land are considered, this only occurs for
LAND, while for LABOR the effect is the opposite: the household which is relatively
less well-endowed in land tends to follow its comparative advantage and send workers to
its counterpart. Homophily is also observed in terms of the quality of dwellings: when
both households have a grass hut the exchange is more likely in labor and inputs. In
terms of differences, households living in grass huts are more likely to lend labor to
households that have huts constructed with more advanced materials (poorer households
lend labor). Formal education can also be a measure of wealth. The sum of education
attainment within the dyad does not increase the likelihood match, but considering the
differences, the more educated household will bes more likely to be a land lender.
As shown in the results for mesostructure, traditional structures are significant pre-
dictors of a household’s position within the various networks. The dyadic effects of village
roles are presented in Table 11. When the role in question can only be filled by a single
villager (Alkalo, VDC head and Elders Council head), only βdif is considered since only
the difference in roles matters. When the role can be shared by other villagers βsum
it is also include to see whether individuals with the same role will be more likely to
form a link. The Alkalo is a lender of both land and credit, while the VDC and Elders
Council heads are only lenders of credit. Other VDC members are also more likely to
have a match, except for INPUT . While the Alkalo’s relatives do not create additional
links amongst themselves, they are more likely to lend land to the rest of the village
(usually the descendants of the first settlers are those who have rights over land). As for
the religious leaders, the Marabout and the Imam are lenders in LAND and CREDIT ,
with Imams also having a higher probability of receiving workers. Griots also tend to be
lenders of land and credit.
Despite a few exceptions, external links are of limited explanatory power at the dyadic
level. For LAND and INPUT , where both parties have an external link (either as a
borrower or as a lenders) it is less likely that they will have a link inside the village. But
if one household in the dyad is an external lender, it is more likely that it will also lend
internally.
Overall, it appears that link formation is related to kinship relationship, the roles that
households play in the village, and differences in endowments. Differences in ethnicity
and income per se seem to be of limited importance.
19
6 Conclusions
In this paper, I have investigated the structure of six social and economic networks at
different levels of disaggregation in a database collected in rural Gambia, with a sample
of 60 villages, 2,810 households and 101,940 (potential) links. I use these particularly
rich data to explore whether network analysis can shed light on various aspects of the
economic development of this rural society, with a particular focus on income distribution
and ethnic fragmentation.
Comparing across villages, it is found that income inequality and poverty indicators
are related to network architecture. In particular, it is found that more unequal vil-
lages have economic networks that are denser and more compact, and thus with more
interactions. This is particularly the case for the exchange of goods and money (input
and credit networks), a result confirmed in the analysis of the factors associated with
a household’s centrality. At the link level, differences in income per se only explain a
match in the credit network. This results might appear to contradict previous findings,
usually at more aggregated levels of analysis, that have shown that higher Gini coeffi-
cients are associated with lower levels of social capital and social interactions (e.g. Knack
and Keefer (1997)). In the small Gambian communities that studied here, things are dif-
ferent: inequality creates opportunities for exchange, which are driven (as shown in the
analysis of the microstructure) by differences in endowments. Since differences amongst
households are often a function of the traditional structure of the village (related to the
roles of the household heads and other members of each household and with shades of the
abandoned caste system), it may be the case that these differences do not create distrust
and are taken into account as unavoidable aspects of village life. One could interpret this
as preliminary evidence for an inverted U-shaped effect of income inequality on the level
of social and economic interactions.
In terms of the effects of ethnic fragmentation, I find little conclusive evidence at the
macrostructure level, except for an increase in the density and compactness of the land
network. At the household level, I find that households belonging to ethnic minorities
participate in very particular ways in networks, with a higher degree as land borrowers
and a lower degree for labor and credit exchange. As for microstructure, most of the
predictions concerning link creation related to ethnicity seem to be captured by the fam-
ily ties variables, though homophily in ethnicity is still relevant in terms of explaining
labor links. One potential explanation for these results is that minority ethnic groups
migrate to villages with an excess supply of land, which is then given to them by the
early settlers who possess the property rights. On the other hand, the newcomers are
still marginalized from other networks. These results also have to be understood in the
context of rural Gambia, where the ethnic composition of villages is often heterogeneous,
but where, despite the traditions preserved by each ethnicity, there is a shared religion
and common culture.
Future research on this particularly rich dataset will be geared towards understanding
the interactions among the various networks and the causal mechanisms that lie behind
link formation, thereby hopefully leading to a deeper understanding of the determinants of
network formation and its effects on economic development in poor West African villages.
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Figure 1: INCOME DISTRIBUTION WITH DIFFERENT SURVEY INSTRUMENTS
Note: Kernel density estimates for the distribution of income with data for 15 villages in
which both surveys were conducted. The household survey drew a random sample of villages
and collected disaggregated data on monthly income The distribution displayed here uses 230
observations. The methodology that lies behind the structured group interview data is
described in the paper. The sample corresponds to all household heads and the distribution
was constructed using 773 observations.
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Figure 3: LABOR NETWORK IN TAMBA KUNDA VILLAGE
Legend: ▽ Alkalo’s relative; ● Alkalo; ● VDC head; ● Marabout; ● Imam.
Macrostructure: D(gm): 0.0869; Cl(gm): 0; Cmp(gm): 0.622.
Note: This figure was produced using UCINET-NetDraw software.
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Table 2: HOUSEHOLD DESCRIPTION
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Household Size 12.67 11.40 1 400
Age of household head 51.70 15.54 15 100
Female Household head 0.06 0.25 0 1
Compound head 0.84 0.37 0 1
Polygamous 0.46 0.50 0 1
Monogamous 0.48 0.50 0 1
Non Muslim 0.04 0.19 0 1
Ethnic minority 0.19 0.40 0 1
Workers in the household (%) 1.27 0.66 0 6
Agricultural land (hectares) 8.06 21.22 0 400
Land per worker (hectares) 2.27 7.40 0 133
Income per capita (GMD) 3,514 4,735 43 125,000
Agricultural income (% of total) 0.12 0.24 0 1
High quality land 0.11 0.32 0 1
Kamanyango 0.05 0.22 0 1
Emigrants 0.48 0.50 0 1
Self respondent 0.73 0.45 0 1
Alkalo’s relative 0.35 0.48 0 1
Alkalo’s assistant 0.04 0.20 0 1
VDC member 0.19 0.39 0 1
Elder council member 0.19 0.39 0 1
Traditional healer 0.20 0.40 0 1
Griot 0.01 0.12 0 1
Note: Household-level descriptive statistics. 2,810 observations for
each variable.
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Table 10: DYADIC REGRESSION: HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS (FOR
LENDERS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Xhhiv LAND LABOR INPUTS INPUT CREDIT
SHARER
Direct kinship relation 0.524*** 1.620*** 1.220*** 2.050*** 1.339***
(0.103) (0.093) (0.091) (0.096) (0.093)
Kinship through marriage 0.180 1.223*** 0.827*** -0.067 0.910***
(0.254) (0.167) (0.222) (0.769) (0.240)
Same ethnic group -0.130 0.328*** 0.088 0.235* 0.036
(0.100) (0.097) (0.123) (0.121) (0.140)
Sum household size 0.185** 0.268*** 0.270*** 0.121* 0.210**
(0.075) (0.069) (0.056) (0.069) (0.082)
Difference household size -0.207*** -0.236*** 0.184*** 0.007 0.313***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.057) (0.063) (0.077)
Sum age -0.073 0.038 -0.037 -0.188 0.011
(0.094) (0.097) (0.106) (0.115) (0.138)
Difference age 0.069 -0.384*** 0.268** 0.019 -0.132
(0.092) (0.107) (0.111) (0.119) (0.119)
Sum % agricultural income 0.126 0.307** 0.202 -0.112 0.234
(0.149) (0.128) (0.128) (0.185) (0.189)
Difference % agricultural income -0.241* 0.067 0.141 0.005 0.347*
(0.145) (0.117) (0.120) (0.169) (0.191)
Sum income per capita -0.005 0.005 0.010 -0.005 0.001
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Difference income per capita 0.009 -0.003 0.010 0.001 0.039***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Sum land 0.099*** 0.026*** 0.015* 0.020* -0.005
(0.020) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014)
Difference land 0.173*** -0.019** 0.013 -0.000 -0.023*
(0.020) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
Sum grass hut 0.025 0.056** 0.045** 0.138*** 0.002
(0.022) (0.029) (0.021) (0.025) (0.028)
Difference grass hut -0.016 0.053** -0.008 -0.002 -0.018
(0.022) (0.027) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025)
Sum formal education -0.172* -0.105 -0.229** 0.048 -0.038
(0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.114) (0.115)
Difference formal education 0.229** 0.068 0.086 -0.002 -0.070
(0.094) (0.096) (0.099) (0.113) (0.112)
Observations 101940 101940 101940 75840 101940
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Two-way (i and j) clustered standard errors
in parentheses. Logit estimates for the model presented in equation (3). Village dummies
and other sums and differences of characteristics that were not statistically significant or
have limited interest were included in the estimations but their associated coefficients are not
reported. The model also include the same variables as those used in Tables 11 and 12.
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Table 11: DYADIC REGRESSION: TRADITIONAL ROLE (FOR LENDERS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Xroleiv LAND LABOR INPUTS INPUT CREDIT
SHARER
Difference Alkalo 1.440*** -0.274 0.199 0.060 0.506**
(0.212) (0.182) (0.153) (0.142) (0.198)
Difference VDC head 0.264 -0.072 0.146 0.023 0.648***
(0.171) (0.163) (0.225) (0.229) (0.251)
Sum VDC member 0.192** 0.129* 0.046 0.082 0.275***
(0.077) (0.070) (0.074) (0.080) (0.081)
Sum Alkalo’s assitant 0.120 0.036 0.425*** 0.001 -0.058
(0.150) (0.123) (0.152) (0.139) (0.154)
Sum Alkalo’s relative 0.106 -0.046 -0.063 -0.053 0.024
(0.077) (0.075) (0.071) (0.092) (0.085)
Difference Alkalo’s relative 0.226*** -0.001 0.059 -0.008 -0.032
(0.070) (0.067) (0.071) (0.076) (0.094)
Difference Elders Council member 0.027 -0.159** 0.023 -0.011 0.149*
(0.083) (0.071) (0.080) (0.096) (0.089)
Difference Elders Council head 0.285 -0.213 0.217 -0.008 0.464**
(0.181) (0.237) (0.214) (0.210) (0.223)
Sum traditional healer 0.075 0.091 0.080 -0.049 0.176*
(0.072) (0.063) (0.064) (0.076) (0.092)
Sum Marabout 0.325** 0.112 0.069 0.219 0.509***
(0.163) (0.169) (0.155) (0.210) (0.172)
Sum Imam 0.330* 0.289 -0.130 -0.373** 0.042
(0.185) (0.220) (0.184) (0.149) (0.220)
Difference Imam 0.226 -0.450** 0.122 0.003 0.465**
(0.180) (0.195) (0.179) (0.150) (0.210)
Difference Griot 0.333* 0.071 0.052 -0.003 0.325*
(0.181) (0.181) (0.186) (0.252) (0.187)
Sum compound head 0.357** 0.017 0.386* -0.035 -0.043
(0.153) (0.173) (0.199) (0.120) (0.185)
Observations 101940 101940 101940 75840 101940
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Two-way (i and j) clustered standard errors
in parentheses. Logit estimates for the model presented in equation (3). Village dummies
and other sums and differences of characteristics that were not statistically significant or
have limited interest were included in the estimations but their associated coefficients are
not reported. The model also include the same variables as those used in Tables 10 and 12.
41
Table 12: DYADIC REGRESSION: EXTERNAL LINKS (FOR LENDERS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Xextivm LAND LABOR INPUTS INPUT CREDIT
SHARER
Sum land external-out -0.267* 0.063 -0.049 0.393*** -0.109
(0.142) (0.116) (0.111) (0.134) (0.151)
Difference land external-out 0.527*** 0.110 0.032 -0.001 0.151
(0.145) (0.110) (0.117) (0.112) (0.141)
Sum land external-in -0.583*** 0.186 0.023 -0.021 0.214
(0.159) (0.118) (0.126) (0.132) (0.134)
Difference land external-in 0.001 0.150 0.376*** 0.004 0.036
(0.170) (0.110) (0.107) (0.137) (0.137)
Sum labor external-out 0.170 -0.114 0.176* 0.353*** -0.130
(0.106) (0.105) (0.102) (0.115) (0.143)
Difference labor external-out 0.113 -0.140 0.027 0.002 -0.063
(0.101) (0.107) (0.095) (0.098) (0.129)
Sum input external-out -0.228 -0.086 -0.230* 0.132 0.131
(0.161) (0.129) (0.138) (0.134) (0.161)
Difference input external-out -0.189 0.207 0.472*** -0.009 0.007
(0.173) (0.131) (0.150) (0.134) (0.154)
Sum input external-in 0.122 0.048 -0.187* -0.678*** -0.038
(0.096) (0.096) (0.102) (0.152) (0.153)
Difference input external-in 0.114 -0.055 0.059 0.004 -0.088
(0.099) (0.089) (0.090) (0.156) (0.148)
Sum credit external-out 0.187 0.182 -0.011 0.152 0.085
(0.118) (0.133) (0.129) (0.117) (0.133)
Difference credit external-out 0.251** 0.060 0.275** -0.010 -0.129
(0.121) (0.128) (0.138) (0.128) (0.123)
Sum credit external-in 0.039 0.025 0.049 -0.009 -0.090
(0.093) (0.084) (0.090) (0.090) (0.130)
Difference credit external-in 0.011 -0.002 -0.144 0.003 0.333***
(0.086) (0.088) (0.088) (0.105) (0.125)
Observations 101940 101940 101940 75840 101940
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Two-way (i and j) clustered standard errors in
parentheses. Logit estimates for the model presented in equation (3). Village dummies
and other sums and differences of characteristics that were not statistically significant
or have limited interest were included in the estimations but their associated coefficients
are not reported. The model also include the same variables as those used in Tables 10
and 11.
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